Engineering a Solution

[Jorahl 0]

The solution to the technical problems in the security department were simpler than Jorahl was explaining it to the underlings which kept asking what he was doing. Malfunctioning systems were not registering properly within the current diagnostic programs. False operational status reports were being recycled about obviously damaged equipment. They needed a way to identify the false reports and restore effected systems.

 

So Jorahl decided to create problems in the first place. Nothing catastrophic mind you. The upgraded subprocessors were now designed to create cryptic anomalies within the programmer's notes and log files. Whenever a diagnostic would be performed the results would be sent to the main engineering repair status computer. If the anomalies were missing or did not match the expected coded sequences then it was known that the status report was inaccurate. The repair computer would then not report a positive receipt of the diagnostic report. This would cause the new subprocessors to retry three more attempts before rerouting the control paths through other subsystems until a positive receipt was achieved. Then a map of the effected parts of the grid would be sent to engineering and repair crews would be assigned.

 

Diagnostic sequences were scheduled at regular intervals. Requests for diagnostic reports could be activated from security, engineering, or Ops as needed. Until the cause of the problem in the first place could be isolated this seemed an effective way to manage the situation.

 

Despite possible disagreements between himself and tr'Jeth, Jorahl had added no other programs to the security systems. There were no control overrides, no bugs, no backdoor accesses of any kind. The system did exactly what he told anyone who asked. It diagnosed, reported, confirmed, and redirected if reports did not match the coded sequences stored in the engineering repair status computer.

 

...it was a totally unavoidable side effect that removing said codes from the repair computer itself would cause the subprocessors to fail all system checks, rerouting systems pointlessly in an impossible attempt to achieve a positive report. The constant rerouting would slow the system and command requests would likely be lost. Such an unlikely event still wouldn't be disastrous.... as long as someone didn't request a diagnostic sequence of every single system in security. The ensuing chaos as system command paths rerouted over each other and competed for system resources could crash the entire command network within the security decks. Safety systems would engage and treat the failure as a possible attack on the security division. This would cause the security decks to go into lock down. Sealed inside with no network access security would be blinded to events outside of it's own area.

 

But, only the station commander, chief engineer, and operations manager would have the clearance to initiate an in depth diagnostic as that.

 

So.... no worries.